Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Mystery of Consciousness', 'What Numbers Are' and 'Logical Atomism'

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
6118 Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis [Russell]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
6116 A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language [Russell]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
6117 Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
6110 Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
6107 It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
6115 Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
17813 Löwenheim-Skolem says any theory with a true interpretation has a model in the natural numbers [White,NP]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
6109 Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17812 Finite cardinalities don't need numbers as objects; numerical quantifiers will do [White,NP]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
6108 Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations [Russell]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
5791 Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle]
5799 Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
10968 Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read]
6113 To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell]
6114 'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell]
21722 Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
6111 As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
5790 A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
5792 Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
5786 A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
5794 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
5795 There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
5788 The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
5789 I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
5798 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
5787 There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
5797 The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
5796 If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
6112 Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell]