68 ideas
3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
15845 | It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one [Plato] |
3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
9867 | It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one [Plato] |
9865 | Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them [Plato] |
21110 | An understanding of the most basic physics should explain all of the subject's mysteries [Krauss] |
3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
21105 | In 1676 it was discovered that water is teeming with life [Krauss] |
14503 | If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed [Plato] |
15857 | Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all [Plato] |
4447 | If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato] |
15856 | A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato] |
374 | If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato] |
3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
389 | How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato] |
3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
390 | If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty [Plato] |
3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
391 | The good involves beauty, proportion and truth [Plato] |
392 | Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient [Plato] |
393 | Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [Plato, by PG] |
385 | Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato] |
387 | A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato] |
373 | Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good [Plato] |
382 | It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain [Plato] |
379 | The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that [Plato] |
376 | Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure? [Plato] |
371 | Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them [Plato] |
381 | We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato] |
386 | Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one [Plato] |
388 | Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous [Plato] |
377 | If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything? [Plato] |
378 | A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish [Plato] |
3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
21109 | Space itself can expand (and separate its contents) at faster than light speeds [Krauss] |
21104 | General Relativity: the density of energy and matter determines curvature and gravity [Krauss] |
21107 | Uncertainty says that energy can be very high over very short time periods [Krauss] |
21106 | Most of the mass of a proton is the energy in virtual particles (rather than the quarks) [Krauss] |
21112 | Empty space contains a continual flux of brief virtual particles [Krauss] |
21108 | The universe is precisely 13.72 billion years old [Krauss] |
21111 | It seems likely that cosmic inflation is eternal, and this would make a multiverse inevitable [Krauss] |