Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Mystery of Consciousness', 'Against the Logicians (two books)' and 'The Folly of Trying to Define Truth'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
22764 Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
23295 Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
23298 Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
23297 The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
23296 We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
5791 Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle]
5799 Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
5790 A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
22762 Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
23294 It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
22759 Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
22760 Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
5792 Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
5786 A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
5794 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
5795 There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
5788 The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
5789 I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
5798 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
5787 There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
5797 The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
5796 If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
22763 We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus]