58 ideas
21584 | A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell] |
21572 | Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell] |
21571 | Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell] |
21574 | Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell] |
21587 | Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell] |
21582 | Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell] |
21573 | When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell] |
3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
21588 | Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell] |
21586 | The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell] |
3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
21585 | The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell] |
3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
21684 | Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell] |
22316 | A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell] |
21576 | With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell] |
21575 | When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell] |
3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
21580 | Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell] |
21227 | The Cogito demands a bridge to the world, and ends in isolating the ego [Velarde-Mayol] |
21215 | The representation may not be a likeness [Velarde-Mayol] |
21583 | When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell] |
21577 | Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell] |
3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
21579 | Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell] |
3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
21578 | Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell] |
6416 | Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling] |
3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
21219 | Find the essence by varying an object, to see what remains invariable [Velarde-Mayol] |
21581 | We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell] |