85 ideas
| 16440 | I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker] |
| 16468 | Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker] |
| 16449 | In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker] |
| 8625 | What physical facts could underlie 0 or 1, or very large numbers? [Frege on Mill] |
| 16464 | We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker] |
| 17895 | Combining two distinct assertions does not necessarily lead to a single 'complex proposition' [Mill] |
| 16465 | In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker] |
| 10427 | All names are names of something, real or imaginary [Mill] |
| 4944 | Mill says names have denotation but not connotation [Mill, by Kripke] |
| 7762 | Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object [Mill, by Lycan] |
| 9801 | Numbers must be assumed to have identical units, as horses are equalised in 'horse-power' [Mill] |
| 8742 | The only axioms needed are for equality, addition, and successive numbers [Mill, by Shapiro] |
| 9800 | Arithmetic is based on definitions, and Sums of equals are equal, and Differences of equals are equal [Mill] |
| 5201 | Mill says logic and maths is induction based on a very large number of instances [Mill, by Ayer] |
| 9360 | If two black and two white objects in practice produced five, what colour is the fifth one? [Lewis,CI on Mill] |
| 9888 | Mill mistakes particular applications as integral to arithmetic, instead of general patterns [Dummett on Mill] |
| 9794 | There are no such things as numbers in the abstract [Mill] |
| 9796 | Things possess the properties of numbers, as quantity, and as countable parts [Mill] |
| 9795 | Numbers have generalised application to entities (such as bodies or sounds) [Mill] |
| 9798 | Different parcels made from three pebbles produce different actual sensations [Mill] |
| 9797 | '2 pebbles and 1 pebble' and '3 pebbles' name the same aggregation, but different facts [Mill] |
| 9799 | 3=2+1 presupposes collections of objects ('Threes'), which may be divided thus [Mill] |
| 9802 | Numbers denote physical properties of physical phenomena [Mill] |
| 9803 | We can't easily distinguish 102 horses from 103, but we could arrange them to make it obvious [Mill] |
| 9804 | Arithmetical results give a mode of formation of a given number [Mill] |
| 9805 | 12 is the cube of 1728 means pebbles can be aggregated a certain way [Mill] |
| 8741 | Numbers must be of something; they don't exist as abstractions [Mill] |
| 12411 | Mill is too imprecise, and is restricted to simple arithmetic [Kitcher on Mill] |
| 5656 | Empirical theories of arithmetic ignore zero, limit our maths, and need probability to get started [Frege on Mill] |
| 9624 | Numbers are a very general property of objects [Mill, by Brown,JR] |
| 16434 | Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker] |
| 16439 | A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker] |
| 16443 | Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker] |
| 16471 | I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16452 | Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker] |
| 9806 | Whatever is made up of parts is made up of parts of those parts [Mill] |
| 11156 | The essence is that without which a thing can neither be, nor be conceived to be [Mill] |
| 16467 | 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker] |
| 16453 | The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker] |
| 12190 | Necessity is what will be, despite any alternative suppositions whatever [Mill] |
| 22623 | Necessity can only mean what must be, without conditions of any kind [Mill] |
| 16466 | Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker] |
| 16438 | Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker] |
| 16436 | Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
| 16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
| 16437 | Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16444 | Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker] |
| 16445 | I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker] |
| 16454 | Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
| 16450 | Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker] |
| 16859 | Most perception is one-tenth observation and nine-tenths inference [Mill] |
| 9082 | Clear concepts result from good observation, extensive experience, and accurate memory [Mill] |
| 16860 | Inductive generalisation is more reliable than one of its instances; they can't all be wrong [Mill] |
| 16845 | The whole theory of induction rests on causes [Mill] |
| 16843 | Mill's methods (Difference,Agreement,Residues,Concomitance,Hypothesis) don't nail induction [Mill, by Lipton] |
| 17086 | Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience [Mill, by Ruben] |
| 17091 | Explanation is fitting of facts into ever more general patterns of regularity [Mill, by Ruben] |
| 16805 | Causal inference is by spotting either Agreements or Differences [Mill, by Lipton] |
| 16835 | The Methods of Difference and of Agreement are forms of inference to the best explanation [Mill, by Lipton] |
| 9079 | We can focus our minds on what is common to a whole class, neglecting other aspects [Mill] |
| 9081 | We don't recognise comparisons by something in our minds; the concepts result from the comparisons [Mill] |
| 16474 | How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker] |
| 9080 | General conceptions are a necessary preliminary to Induction [Mill] |
| 9078 | The study of the nature of Abstract Ideas does not belong to logic, but to a different science [Mill] |
| 16461 | We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker] |
| 16448 | Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker] |
| 16442 | I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker] |
| 16447 | A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker] |
| 16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
| 20937 | The state should produce higher civilisations for all, in tune with the economic apparatus [Gramsci] |
| 20935 | Eventually political parties lose touch with the class they represent, which is dangerous [Gramsci] |
| 20936 | Caesarism emerges when two forces in society are paralysed in conflict [Gramsci] |
| 20941 | Totalitarian parties cut their members off from other cultural organisations [Gramsci] |
| 20939 | What is the function of a parliament? Does it even constitute a part of the State structure? [Gramsci] |
| 20938 | Liberalism's weakness is its powerful rigid bureaucracy [Gramsci] |
| 20940 | Perfect political equality requires economic equality [Gramsci] |
| 8345 | A cause is the total of all the conditions which inevitably produce the result [Mill] |
| 10391 | Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill] |
| 14547 | The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill] |
| 8377 | Causation is just invariability of succession between every natural fact and a preceding fact [Mill] |
| 14545 | A cause is an antecedent which invariably and unconditionally leads to a phenomenon [Mill] |
| 4773 | Mill's regularity theory of causation is based on an effect preceded by a conjunction of causes [Mill, by Psillos] |
| 4775 | In Mill's 'Method of Agreement' cause is the common factor in a range of different cases [Mill, by Psillos] |
| 4776 | In Mill's 'Method of Difference' the cause is what stops the effect when it is removed [Mill, by Psillos] |
| 9417 | What are the fewest propositions from which all natural uniformities could be inferred? [Mill] |