67 ideas
12644 | Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy [Fodor] |
14799 | Metaphysics rests on observations, but ones so common we hardly notice them [Peirce] |
12633 | Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension [Fodor] |
12664 | A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor] |
12648 | Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor] |
12650 | 'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor] |
12656 | P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor] |
12653 | There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility [Fodor] |
12651 | Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone' [Fodor] |
12628 | Knowing that must come before knowing how [Fodor] |
12625 | Pragmatism is the worst idea ever [Fodor] |
12636 | Mental states have causal powers [Fodor] |
12661 | The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor] |
12632 | In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor] |
12624 | Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor] |
12640 | Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor] |
12641 | Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor] |
12643 | Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor] |
12649 | We think in file names [Fodor] |
12647 | Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor] |
12655 | Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor] |
12630 | If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor] |
12658 | Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor] |
12662 | We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor] |
12635 | Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor] |
12652 | Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor] |
12626 | Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor] |
12637 | Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor] |
12638 | If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor] |
12639 | Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor] |
12654 | You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor] |
12659 | Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor] |
12660 | One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor] |
12629 | For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor] |
12631 | Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor] |
12657 | Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor] |
12634 | 'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor] |
12642 | Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor] |
12663 | We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor] |
12645 | Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor] |
12646 | Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor] |
12627 | Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor] |
7222 | It is a crime for someone with a violent disposition to get drunk [Mill] |
7214 | Ethics rests on utility, which is the permanent progressive interests of people [Mill] |
7212 | Individuals have sovereignty over their own bodies and minds [Mill] |
7210 | The will of the people is that of the largest or most active part of the people [Mill] |
7227 | It is evil to give a government any more power than is necessary [Mill] |
7228 | Individuals often do things better than governments [Mill] |
7230 | Aim for the maximum dissemination of power consistent with efficiency [Mill] |
20515 | Maximise happiness by an area of strict privacy, and an area of utilitarian interventions [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
7229 | People who transact their own business will also have the initiative to control their government [Mill] |
7211 | Prevention of harm to others is the only justification for exercising power over people [Mill] |
7231 | The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it [Mill] |
7217 | The main argument for freedom is that interference with it is usually misguided [Mill] |
7213 | Liberty arises at the point where people can freely and equally discuss things [Mill] |
20517 | Utilitarianism values liberty, but guides us on which ones we should have or not have [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
20516 | Mill defends freedom as increasing happiness, but maybe it is an intrinsic good [Wolff,J on Mill] |
7215 | True freedom is pursuing our own good, while not impeding others [Mill] |
7218 | Individuals are not accountable for actions which only concern themselves [Mill] |
7221 | Blocking entry to an unsafe bridge does not infringe liberty, since no one wants unsafe bridges [Mill] |
7223 | Pimping and running a gambling-house are on the border between toleration and restraint [Mill] |
7220 | Restraint for its own sake is an evil [Mill] |
7219 | Society can punish actions which it believes to be prejudicial to others [Mill] |
7226 | Benefits performed by individuals, not by government, help also to educate them [Mill] |
7224 | We need individual opinions and conduct, and State education is a means to prevent that [Mill] |
7225 | It is a crime to create a being who lacks the ordinary chances of a desirable existence [Mill] |
7216 | The ethics of the Gospel has been supplemented by barbarous Old Testament values [Mill] |