110 ideas
| 8605 | In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis] |
| 8607 | Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis] |
| 2392 | Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other [Chalmers] |
| 2393 | Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
| 2394 | Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
| 8606 | A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis] |
| 2398 | Reduction requires logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
| 8580 | Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis] |
| 16048 | Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K] |
| 2401 | All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me [Chalmers] |
| 8571 | Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis] |
| 10717 | Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver] |
| 16217 | Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley] |
| 8613 | Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis] |
| 8585 | Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis] |
| 8586 | Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis] |
| 8589 | For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis] |
| 15460 | All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis] |
| 15726 | Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis] |
| 7031 | Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil] |
| 8572 | Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis] |
| 18433 | There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis] |
| 8604 | We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis] |
| 14499 | Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki] |
| 15120 | Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne] |
| 8573 | Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis] |
| 8569 | I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis] |
| 21961 | Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW] |
| 8576 | The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis] |
| 8570 | To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis] |
| 8574 | Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis] |
| 16424 | Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers] |
| 16425 | Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers] |
| 16426 | How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world [Chalmers] |
| 13956 | Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers] |
| 13963 | Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers] |
| 2407 | One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers] |
| 2390 | We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour [Chalmers] |
| 2397 | 'Perception' means either an action or a mental state [Chalmers] |
| 2422 | The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it [Chalmers] |
| 2396 | Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation [Chalmers] |
| 2426 | Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained? [Chalmers] |
| 2391 | Can we be aware but not conscious? [Chalmers] |
| 2412 | Can we explain behaviour without consciousness? [Chalmers] |
| 2386 | Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers] |
| 2416 | What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers] |
| 2423 | Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers] |
| 2403 | Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 2400 | Is intentionality just causal connections? [Chalmers] |
| 2389 | Sometimes we don't notice our pains [Chalmers] |
| 2419 | Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement? [Chalmers] |
| 2402 | It seems possible to invert qualia [Chalmers] |
| 2415 | In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing [Chalmers] |
| 2414 | When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers] |
| 2409 | Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers] |
| 2411 | Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers] |
| 2424 | It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers] |
| 2413 | If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 2417 | Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers] |
| 2428 | Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers] |
| 2418 | The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers] |
| 2406 | H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers] |
| 2405 | Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers] |
| 2395 | Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
| 9318 | Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford] |
| 2404 | Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers] |
| 8579 | Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis] |
| 2429 | Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers] |
| 18403 | Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it [Chalmers] |
| 14708 | Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter] |
| 13958 | The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers] |
| 2399 | Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers] |
| 13959 | The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers] |
| 13957 | Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers] |
| 13961 | We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers] |
| 13962 | Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers] |
| 13960 | In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers] |
| 8614 | A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis] |
| 8615 | We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis] |
| 7222 | It is a crime for someone with a violent disposition to get drunk [Mill] |
| 7214 | Ethics rests on utility, which is the permanent progressive interests of people [Mill] |
| 7212 | Individuals have sovereignty over their own bodies and minds [Mill] |
| 7210 | The will of the people is that of the largest or most active part of the people [Mill] |
| 7227 | It is evil to give a government any more power than is necessary [Mill] |
| 7228 | Individuals often do things better than governments [Mill] |
| 7230 | Aim for the maximum dissemination of power consistent with efficiency [Mill] |
| 20515 | Maximise happiness by an area of strict privacy, and an area of utilitarian interventions [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
| 7229 | People who transact their own business will also have the initiative to control their government [Mill] |
| 7211 | Prevention of harm to others is the only justification for exercising power over people [Mill] |
| 7231 | The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it [Mill] |
| 7217 | The main argument for freedom is that interference with it is usually misguided [Mill] |
| 7213 | Liberty arises at the point where people can freely and equally discuss things [Mill] |
| 20517 | Utilitarianism values liberty, but guides us on which ones we should have or not have [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
| 20516 | Mill defends freedom as increasing happiness, but maybe it is an intrinsic good [Wolff,J on Mill] |
| 7215 | True freedom is pursuing our own good, while not impeding others [Mill] |
| 7218 | Individuals are not accountable for actions which only concern themselves [Mill] |
| 7221 | Blocking entry to an unsafe bridge does not infringe liberty, since no one wants unsafe bridges [Mill] |
| 7223 | Pimping and running a gambling-house are on the border between toleration and restraint [Mill] |
| 7220 | Restraint for its own sake is an evil [Mill] |
| 7219 | Society can punish actions which it believes to be prejudicial to others [Mill] |
| 7226 | Benefits performed by individuals, not by government, help also to educate them [Mill] |
| 7224 | We need individual opinions and conduct, and State education is a means to prevent that [Mill] |
| 7225 | It is a crime to create a being who lacks the ordinary chances of a desirable existence [Mill] |
| 8608 | Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis] |
| 8584 | Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis] |
| 8581 | Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis] |
| 15727 | Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis] |
| 8611 | A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis] |
| 16427 | Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible [Chalmers] |
| 7216 | The ethics of the Gospel has been supplemented by barbarous Old Testament values [Mill] |