9 ideas
8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
14283 | A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition [Lewis, by Edgington] |
8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
7076 | Mill wondered if he would be happy if all his aims were realised, and answered no [Mill, by Critchley] |
10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |