33 ideas
15053 | If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K] |
15054 | 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K] |
15007 | If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K] |
15006 | Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider] |
15055 | Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K] |
15050 | Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K] |
15051 | Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K] |
15052 | Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K] |
15056 | The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K] |
15047 | What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K] |
15046 | Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K] |
15060 | Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K] |
15048 | In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K] |
7630 | Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund] |
7632 | Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund] |
15061 | Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K] |
7635 | Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund] |
7638 | One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund] |
7642 | The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund] |
7640 | Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund] |
7641 | Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund] |
15059 | Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K] |
15057 | Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K] |
7637 | Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG] |
15058 | A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K] |
21332 | We don't get a love of 'order' from nature - which is thoroughly chaotic [Mill] |
21333 | Evil comes from good just as often as good comes from evil [Mill] |
21335 | Belief that an afterlife is required for justice is an admission that this life is very unjust [Mill] |
21334 | No necessity ties an omnipotent Creator, so he evidently wills human misery [Mill] |
21329 | Nature dispenses cruelty with no concern for either mercy or justice [Mill] |
21328 | Killing is a human crime, but nature kills everyone, and often with great tortures [Mill] |
21330 | Nature makes childbirth a miserable experience, often leading to the death of the mother [Mill] |
21331 | Hurricanes, locusts, floods and blight can starve a million people to death [Mill] |