84 ideas
3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
22919 | A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist [Le Poidevin] |
3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
22926 | In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive [Le Poidevin] |
3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
22932 | We don't just describe a time as 'now' from a private viewpoint, but as a fact about the world [Le Poidevin] |
7222 | It is a crime for someone with a violent disposition to get drunk [Mill] |
7214 | Ethics rests on utility, which is the permanent progressive interests of people [Mill] |
7212 | Individuals have sovereignty over their own bodies and minds [Mill] |
7210 | The will of the people is that of the largest or most active part of the people [Mill] |
7227 | It is evil to give a government any more power than is necessary [Mill] |
7228 | Individuals often do things better than governments [Mill] |
7230 | Aim for the maximum dissemination of power consistent with efficiency [Mill] |
20515 | Maximise happiness by an area of strict privacy, and an area of utilitarian interventions [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
7229 | People who transact their own business will also have the initiative to control their government [Mill] |
7211 | Prevention of harm to others is the only justification for exercising power over people [Mill] |
7231 | The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it [Mill] |
7217 | The main argument for freedom is that interference with it is usually misguided [Mill] |
7213 | Liberty arises at the point where people can freely and equally discuss things [Mill] |
20517 | Utilitarianism values liberty, but guides us on which ones we should have or not have [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
20516 | Mill defends freedom as increasing happiness, but maybe it is an intrinsic good [Wolff,J on Mill] |
7215 | True freedom is pursuing our own good, while not impeding others [Mill] |
7218 | Individuals are not accountable for actions which only concern themselves [Mill] |
7221 | Blocking entry to an unsafe bridge does not infringe liberty, since no one wants unsafe bridges [Mill] |
7223 | Pimping and running a gambling-house are on the border between toleration and restraint [Mill] |
7220 | Restraint for its own sake is an evil [Mill] |
7219 | Society can punish actions which it believes to be prejudicial to others [Mill] |
7226 | Benefits performed by individuals, not by government, help also to educate them [Mill] |
7224 | We need individual opinions and conduct, and State education is a means to prevent that [Mill] |
7225 | It is a crime to create a being who lacks the ordinary chances of a desirable existence [Mill] |
22927 | The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity [Le Poidevin] |
22922 | We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist [Le Poidevin] |
22924 | If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition [Le Poidevin] |
22923 | Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths [Le Poidevin] |
22928 | For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space [Le Poidevin] |
22931 | We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment [Le Poidevin] |
22917 | Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length [Le Poidevin] |
22921 | Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending [Le Poidevin] |
22934 | Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process' [Le Poidevin] |
22938 | To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real [Le Poidevin] |
22939 | The B-series doesn't seem to allow change [Le Poidevin] |
22940 | If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it? [Le Poidevin] |
22947 | An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later [Le Poidevin] |
22952 | If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected? [Le Poidevin] |
22951 | If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events [Le Poidevin] |
22948 | There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time [Le Poidevin] |
22949 | Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete [Le Poidevin] |
22950 | If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable [Le Poidevin] |
22953 | Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect [Le Poidevin] |
22943 | Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere [Le Poidevin] |
22945 | The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times [Le Poidevin] |
22937 | If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers [Le Poidevin] |
22925 | The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present [Le Poidevin] |
22944 | The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants [Le Poidevin] |
22942 | If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short [Le Poidevin] |
22946 | The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces [Le Poidevin] |
22941 | How could a timeless God know what time it is? So could God be both timeless and omniscient? [Le Poidevin] |
7216 | The ethics of the Gospel has been supplemented by barbarous Old Testament values [Mill] |