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All the ideas for 'On Liberty', 'Category Mistakes' and 'Aspects of Scientific Explanation'

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80 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
People have dreams which involve category mistakes [Magidor]
Category mistakes are either syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / b. Category mistake as syntactic
Category mistakes seem to be universal across languages [Magidor]
Category mistakes as syntactic needs a huge number of fine-grained rules [Magidor]
Embedded (in 'he said that…') category mistakes show syntax isn't the problem [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / c. Category mistake as semantic
Category mistakes are meaningful, because metaphors are meaningful category mistakes [Magidor]
The normal compositional view makes category mistakes meaningful [Magidor]
If a category mistake is synonymous across two languages, that implies it is meaningful [Magidor]
If a category mistake has unimaginable truth-conditions, then it seems to be meaningless [Magidor]
A good explanation of why category mistakes sound wrong is that they are meaningless [Magidor]
Category mistakes are neither verifiable nor analytic, so verificationism says they are meaningless [Magidor]
Category mistakes play no role in mental life, so conceptual role semantics makes them meaningless [Magidor]
Maybe when you say 'two is green', the predicate somehow fails to apply? [Magidor]
If category mistakes aren't syntax failure or meaningless, maybe they just lack a truth-value? [Magidor]
Two good sentences should combine to make a good sentence, but that might be absurd [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / d. Category mistake as pragmatic
Maybe the presuppositions of category mistakes are the abilities of things? [Magidor]
Category mistakes suffer from pragmatic presupposition failure (which is not mere triviality) [Magidor]
Category mistakes because of presuppositions still have a truth value (usually 'false') [Magidor]
In 'two is green', 'green' has a presupposition of being coloured [Magidor]
'Numbers are coloured and the number two is green' seems to be acceptable [Magidor]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / e. Category mistake as ontological
The presuppositions in category mistakes reveal nothing about ontology [Magidor]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 8. Intensional Logic
Intensional logic maps logical space, showing which predicates are compatible or incompatible [Magidor]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
Some suggest that the Julius Caesar problem involves category mistakes [Magidor]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
We can explain the statue/clay problem by a category mistake with a false premise [Magidor]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird]
The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances [Magidor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Two sentences with different meanings can, on occasion, have the same content [Magidor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
To grasp 'two' and 'green', must you know that two is not green? [Magidor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Generative semantics says structure is determined by semantics as well as syntactic rules [Magidor]
'John is easy to please' and 'John is eager to please' have different deep structure [Magidor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
The semantics of a sentence is its potential for changing a context [Magidor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Weaker compositionality says meaningful well-formed sentences get the meaning from the parts [Magidor]
Strong compositionality says meaningful expressions syntactically well-formed are meaningful [Magidor]
Understanding unlimited numbers of sentences suggests that meaning is compositional [Magidor]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds? [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
A sentence can be meaningful, and yet lack a truth value [Magidor]
In the pragmatic approach, presuppositions are assumed in a context, for successful assertion [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
The infelicitiousness of trivial truth is explained by uninformativeness, or a static context-set [Magidor]
The infelicitiousness of trivial falsity is explained by expectations, or the loss of a context-set [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / c. Presupposition
A presupposition is what makes an utterance sound wrong if it is not assumed? [Magidor]
A test for presupposition would be if it provoked 'hey wait a minute - I have no idea that....' [Magidor]
The best tests for presupposition are projecting it to negation, conditional, conjunction, questions [Magidor]
If both s and not-s entail a sentence p, then p is a presupposition [Magidor]
Why do certain words trigger presuppositions? [Magidor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
One theory says metaphors mean the same as the corresponding simile [Magidor]
Theories of metaphor divide over whether they must have literal meanings [Magidor]
The simile view of metaphors removes their magic, and won't explain why we use them [Magidor]
Maybe a metaphor is just a substitute for what is intended literally, like 'icy' for 'unemotional' [Magidor]
Gricean theories of metaphor involve conversational implicatures based on literal meanings [Magidor]
Non-cognitivist views of metaphor says there are no metaphorical meanings, just effects of the literal [Magidor]
Metaphors tend to involve category mistakes, by joining disjoint domains [Magidor]
Metaphors as substitutes for the literal misses one predicate varying with context [Magidor]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
It is a crime for someone with a violent disposition to get drunk [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Ethics rests on utility, which is the permanent progressive interests of people [Mill]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
Individuals have sovereignty over their own bodies and minds [Mill]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The will of the people is that of the largest or most active part of the people [Mill]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
It is evil to give a government any more power than is necessary [Mill]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
Individuals often do things better than governments [Mill]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / b. Devolution
Aim for the maximum dissemination of power consistent with efficiency [Mill]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Maximise happiness by an area of strict privacy, and an area of utilitarian interventions [Mill, by Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
People who transact their own business will also have the initiative to control their government [Mill]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Prevention of harm to others is the only justification for exercising power over people [Mill]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it [Mill]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
The main argument for freedom is that interference with it is usually misguided [Mill]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Liberty arises at the point where people can freely and equally discuss things [Mill]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Utilitarianism values liberty, but guides us on which ones we should have or not have [Mill, by Wolff,J]
Mill defends freedom as increasing happiness, but maybe it is an intrinsic good [Wolff,J on Mill]
True freedom is pursuing our own good, while not impeding others [Mill]
Individuals are not accountable for actions which only concern themselves [Mill]
Blocking entry to an unsafe bridge does not infringe liberty, since no one wants unsafe bridges [Mill]
Pimping and running a gambling-house are on the border between toleration and restraint [Mill]
Restraint for its own sake is an evil [Mill]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Society can punish actions which it believes to be prejudicial to others [Mill]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
Benefits performed by individuals, not by government, help also to educate them [Mill]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
We need individual opinions and conduct, and State education is a means to prevent that [Mill]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
It is a crime to create a being who lacks the ordinary chances of a desirable existence [Mill]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
The ethics of the Gospel has been supplemented by barbarous Old Testament values [Mill]