Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Liberty', 'Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd)' and 'Defending the Axioms'

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88 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Good inference has mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility and background fit [Lipton]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
Contrary pairs entail contradictions; one member entails negation of the other [Lipton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The Axiom of Choice paradoxically allows decomposing a sphere into two identical spheres [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Critics of if-thenism say that not all starting points, even consistent ones, are worth studying [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Hilbert's geometry and Dedekind's real numbers were role models for axiomatization [Maddy]
If two mathematical themes coincide, that suggest a single deep truth [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
Every infinite set of reals is either countable or of the same size as the full set of reals [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Set-theory tracks the contours of mathematical depth and fruitfulness [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
The connection of arithmetic to perception has been idealised away in modern infinitary mathematics [Maddy]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is not mysterious - it is just more knowledge, of causes [Lipton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis? [Lipton]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them? [Lipton]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence [Lipton]
Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability [Lipton]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton]
Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from? [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction [Lipton]
An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens) [Lipton]
My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens [Lipton]
A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes [Lipton]
We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory [Lipton]
To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes [Lipton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true [Lipton]
Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one [Lipton]
Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it [Lipton]
Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising' [Lipton]
Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
An explanation gives the reason the phenomenon occurred [Lipton]
An explanation is what makes the unfamiliar familiar to us [Lipton]
An explanation is what is added to knowledge to yield understanding [Lipton]
Seaching for explanations is a good way to discover the structure of the world [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / b. Contrastive explanations
In 'contrastive' explanation there is a fact and a foil - why that fact, rather than this foil? [Lipton]
With too many causes, find a suitable 'foil' for contrast, and the field narrows right down [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
An explanation unifies a phenomenon with our account of other phenomena [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions [Lipton]
Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts! [Lipton]
We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism [Lipton]
Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal [Lipton]
A cause may not be an explanation [Lipton]
Explanations may be easier to find than causes [Lipton]
Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
To maximise probability, don't go beyond your data [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Is Inference to the Best Explanation nothing more than inferring the likeliest cause? [Lipton]
Best Explanation as a guide to inference is preferable to best standard explanations [Lipton]
The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding [Lipton]
Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding [Lipton]
IBE is inferring that the best potential explanation is the actual explanation [Lipton]
IBE is not passive treatment of data, but involves feedback between theory and data search [Lipton]
A contrasting difference is the cause if it offers the best explanation [Lipton]
We select possible explanations for explanatory reasons, as well as choosing among them [Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
Must we only have one explanation, and must all the data be made relevant? [Lipton]
Bayesians say best explanations build up an incoherent overall position [Lipton]
The best theory is boring: compare 'all planets move elliptically' with 'most of them do' [Lipton]
Best explanation can't be a guide to truth, because the truth must precede explanation [Lipton]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
It is a crime for someone with a violent disposition to get drunk [Mill]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Ethics rests on utility, which is the permanent progressive interests of people [Mill]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / a. Natural freedom
Individuals have sovereignty over their own bodies and minds [Mill]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The will of the people is that of the largest or most active part of the people [Mill]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
It is evil to give a government any more power than is necessary [Mill]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
Individuals often do things better than governments [Mill]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / b. Devolution
Aim for the maximum dissemination of power consistent with efficiency [Mill]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Maximise happiness by an area of strict privacy, and an area of utilitarian interventions [Mill, by Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
People who transact their own business will also have the initiative to control their government [Mill]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Prevention of harm to others is the only justification for exercising power over people [Mill]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it [Mill]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
The main argument for freedom is that interference with it is usually misguided [Mill]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Liberty arises at the point where people can freely and equally discuss things [Mill]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Utilitarianism values liberty, but guides us on which ones we should have or not have [Mill, by Wolff,J]
Mill defends freedom as increasing happiness, but maybe it is an intrinsic good [Wolff,J on Mill]
True freedom is pursuing our own good, while not impeding others [Mill]
Individuals are not accountable for actions which only concern themselves [Mill]
Blocking entry to an unsafe bridge does not infringe liberty, since no one wants unsafe bridges [Mill]
Pimping and running a gambling-house are on the border between toleration and restraint [Mill]
Restraint for its own sake is an evil [Mill]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Society can punish actions which it believes to be prejudicial to others [Mill]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
Benefits performed by individuals, not by government, help also to educate them [Mill]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
We need individual opinions and conduct, and State education is a means to prevent that [Mill]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
It is a crime to create a being who lacks the ordinary chances of a desirable existence [Mill]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient [Lipton]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
The ethics of the Gospel has been supplemented by barbarous Old Testament values [Mill]