99 ideas
| 3426 | If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim] |
| 3431 | Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty) [Kim] |
| 3437 | 'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan [Kim] |
| 3430 | Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim] |
| 3432 | Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim] |
| 3434 | Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim] |
| 3436 | Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim] |
| 472 | No things would be clear to us as entity or relationships unless there existed Number and its essence [Philolaus] |
| 3406 | Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG] |
| 3368 | Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect? [Kim] |
| 3392 | Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim] |
| 3396 | Experiment requires mental causation [Kim] |
| 3397 | Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim] |
| 3367 | Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim] |
| 3365 | Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim] |
| 3360 | Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim] |
| 3366 | Pain has no reference or content [Kim] |
| 3389 | Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim] |
| 3391 | Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG] |
| 3422 | Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim] |
| 3363 | We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim] |
| 3412 | How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim] |
| 3409 | Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim] |
| 3399 | If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim] |
| 3390 | Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim] |
| 3414 | What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim] |
| 3359 | Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim] |
| 3369 | Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim] |
| 3428 | Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim] |
| 3380 | Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim] |
| 3370 | What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim] |
| 3371 | Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim] |
| 3372 | Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim] |
| 3373 | Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim] |
| 3379 | Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim] |
| 3388 | Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim] |
| 3384 | The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim] |
| 3393 | How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim] |
| 3439 | Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim] |
| 3427 | Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim] |
| 3376 | We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim] |
| 3424 | Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim] |
| 3362 | Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim] |
| 3413 | Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim] |
| 3374 | Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim] |
| 3433 | The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim] |
| 3377 | Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim] |
| 3438 | Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim] |
| 3440 | Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim] |
| 3375 | If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim] |
| 3411 | How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim] |
| 3387 | A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling [Kim] |
| 3386 | Folk psychology has been remarkably durable [Kim] |
| 3410 | Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism [Kim] |
| 3394 | Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory [Kim] |
| 3382 | A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test [Kim] |
| 3383 | The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements [Kim] |
| 3408 | Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim] |
| 3420 | Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim] |
| 3418 | 'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim] |
| 3416 | Content may match several things in the environment [Kim] |
| 3421 | Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim] |
| 3417 | Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim] |
| 3419 | Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim] |
| 3403 | We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs [Kim] |
| 3402 | If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction [Kim] |
| 7222 | It is a crime for someone with a violent disposition to get drunk [Mill] |
| 7214 | Ethics rests on utility, which is the permanent progressive interests of people [Mill] |
| 7212 | Individuals have sovereignty over their own bodies and minds [Mill] |
| 7210 | The will of the people is that of the largest or most active part of the people [Mill] |
| 7227 | It is evil to give a government any more power than is necessary [Mill] |
| 7228 | Individuals often do things better than governments [Mill] |
| 7230 | Aim for the maximum dissemination of power consistent with efficiency [Mill] |
| 20515 | Maximise happiness by an area of strict privacy, and an area of utilitarian interventions [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
| 7229 | People who transact their own business will also have the initiative to control their government [Mill] |
| 7211 | Prevention of harm to others is the only justification for exercising power over people [Mill] |
| 7231 | The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it [Mill] |
| 7217 | The main argument for freedom is that interference with it is usually misguided [Mill] |
| 7213 | Liberty arises at the point where people can freely and equally discuss things [Mill] |
| 20517 | Utilitarianism values liberty, but guides us on which ones we should have or not have [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
| 20516 | Mill defends freedom as increasing happiness, but maybe it is an intrinsic good [Wolff,J on Mill] |
| 7215 | True freedom is pursuing our own good, while not impeding others [Mill] |
| 7218 | Individuals are not accountable for actions which only concern themselves [Mill] |
| 7221 | Blocking entry to an unsafe bridge does not infringe liberty, since no one wants unsafe bridges [Mill] |
| 7223 | Pimping and running a gambling-house are on the border between toleration and restraint [Mill] |
| 7220 | Restraint for its own sake is an evil [Mill] |
| 7219 | Society can punish actions which it believes to be prejudicial to others [Mill] |
| 7226 | Benefits performed by individuals, not by government, help also to educate them [Mill] |
| 7224 | We need individual opinions and conduct, and State education is a means to prevent that [Mill] |
| 7225 | It is a crime to create a being who lacks the ordinary chances of a desirable existence [Mill] |
| 1519 | Harmony must pre-exist the cosmos, to bring the dissimilar sources together [Philolaus] |
| 473 | There is no falsehood in harmony and number, only in irrational things [Philolaus] |
| 1518 | Everything must involve numbers, or it couldn't be thought about or known [Philolaus] |
| 469 | Existing things, and hence the Cosmos, are a mixture of the Limited and the Unlimited [Philolaus] |
| 3401 | A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim] |
| 3407 | Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause [Kim] |
| 476 | Self-created numbers make the universe stable [Philolaus] |
| 1787 | Philolaus was the first person to say the earth moves in a circle [Philolaus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 7216 | The ethics of the Gospel has been supplemented by barbarous Old Testament values [Mill] |