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All the ideas for 'System of Logic', 'Meditations' and 'works'

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171 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
Modern science comes from Descartes' view that knowledge doesn't need moral purity [Descartes, by Foucault]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
Descartes impoverished the classical idea of logos, and it no longer covered human experience [Roochnik on Descartes]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reason says don't assent to uncertain principles, just as much as totally false ones [Descartes]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Since Plato all philosophers have followed the herd, except Descartes, stuck in superficial reason [Nietzsche on Descartes]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Do not multiply entities beyond necessity [William of Ockham]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
It is circular to make truth depend on believing God's existence is true [Arnauld on Descartes]
Descartes is right that in the Christian view only God can guarantee the reliability of senses [Nietzsche on Descartes]
Once it is clear that there is a God who is no deceiver, I conclude that clear and distinct perceptions must be true [Descartes]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
My general rule is that everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly is true [Descartes]
Someone may think a thing is 'clear and distinct', but be wrong [Leibniz on Descartes]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
What physical facts could underlie 0 or 1, or very large numbers? [Frege on Mill]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Arithmetic and geometry achieve some certainty without worrying about existence [Descartes]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
Combining two distinct assertions does not necessarily lead to a single 'complex proposition' [Mill]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
All names are names of something, real or imaginary [Mill]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Mill says names have denotation but not connotation [Mill, by Kripke]
Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object [Mill, by Lycan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Surely maths is true even if I am dreaming? [Descartes]
I can learn the concepts of duration and number just from observing my own thoughts [Descartes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Numbers must be assumed to have identical units, as horses are equalised in 'horse-power' [Mill]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
The only axioms needed are for equality, addition, and successive numbers [Mill, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Arithmetic is based on definitions, and Sums of equals are equal, and Differences of equals are equal [Mill]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Mill says logic and maths is induction based on a very large number of instances [Mill, by Ayer]
If two black and two white objects in practice produced five, what colour is the fifth one? [Lewis,CI on Mill]
Mill mistakes particular applications as integral to arithmetic, instead of general patterns [Dummett on Mill]
There are no such things as numbers in the abstract [Mill]
Things possess the properties of numbers, as quantity, and as countable parts [Mill]
Numbers have generalised application to entities (such as bodies or sounds) [Mill]
Different parcels made from three pebbles produce different actual sensations [Mill]
'2 pebbles and 1 pebble' and '3 pebbles' name the same aggregation, but different facts [Mill]
3=2+1 presupposes collections of objects ('Threes'), which may be divided thus [Mill]
Numbers denote physical properties of physical phenomena [Mill]
We can't easily distinguish 102 horses from 103, but we could arrange them to make it obvious [Mill]
Arithmetical results give a mode of formation of a given number [Mill]
12 is the cube of 1728 means pebbles can be aggregated a certain way [Mill]
Numbers must be of something; they don't exist as abstractions [Mill]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Mill is too imprecise, and is restricted to simple arithmetic [Kitcher on Mill]
Empirical theories of arithmetic ignore zero, limit our maths, and need probability to get started [Frege on Mill]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Numbers are a very general property of objects [Mill, by Brown,JR]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
Species and genera are individual concepts which naturally signify many individuals [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
If I can separate two things in my understanding, then God can separate them in reality [Descartes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
If we remove surface qualities from wax, we have an extended, flexible, changeable thing [Descartes]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Whatever is made up of parts is made up of parts of those parts [Mill]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Descartes, by Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
The essence is that without which a thing can neither be, nor be conceived to be [Mill]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessity is what will be, despite any alternative suppositions whatever [Mill]
Necessity can only mean what must be, without conditions of any kind [Mill]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone [Descartes]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld on Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Belief is not an intellectual state or act, because propositions are affirmed or denied by the will [Descartes, by Zagzebski]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Descartes tried to model reason on maths instead of 'logos' [Roochnik on Descartes]
Labelling slightly doubtful things as false is irrational [Roochnik on Descartes]
Maybe there is only one certain fact, which is that nothing is certain [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Descartes transformed 'God is thinkable, so he exists' into 'I think, so I exist' [Descartes, by Feuerbach]
In the Meditations version of the Cogito he says "I am; I exist", which avoids presenting it as an argument [Descartes, by Baggini /Fosl]
If I don't think, there is no reason to think that I exist [Descartes]
Modern philosophy set the self-conscious ego in place of God [Descartes, by Feuerbach]
"I think therefore I am" is the absolute truth of consciousness [Sartre on Descartes]
I must even exist if I am being deceived by something [Descartes]
"I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind [Descartes]
The Cogito is a transcendental argument, not a piece of a priori knowledge [Rey on Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
The Cogito proves subjective experience is basic, but makes false claims about the Self [Russell on Descartes]
Maybe 'I' am not the thinker, but something produced by thought [Nietzsche on Descartes]
The Cogito only works if you already understand what thought and existence are [Mersenne on Descartes]
It is a precondition of the use of the word 'I' that I exist [Ayer on Descartes]
The thing which experiences may be momentary, and change with the next experience [Russell on Descartes]
'I think' assumes I exist, that thinking is known and caused, and that I am doing it [Nietzsche on Descartes]
A thought doesn't imply other thoughts, or enough thoughts to make up a self [Ayer on Descartes]
That I perform an activity (thinking) doesn't prove what type of thing I am [Hobbes on Descartes]
Autistic children seem to use the 'I' concept without seeing themselves as thinkers [Segal on Descartes]
The Cogito assumes a priori the existence of substance, when actually it is a grammatical custom [Nietzsche on Descartes]
How can we infer that all thinking involves self-consciousness, just from my own case? [Kant on Descartes]
My self is not an inference from 'I think', but a presupposition of it [Kant on Descartes]
We cannot give any information a priori about the nature of the 'thing that thinks' [Kant on Descartes]
The fact that I am a subject is not enough evidence to show that I am a substantial object [Kant on Descartes]
Descartes' claim to know his existence before his essence is misleading or absurd [Descartes, by Lowe]
Modern self-consciousness is a doubtful abstraction; only senses and feelings are certain [Feuerbach on Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
A triangle has a separate non-invented nature, shown by my ability to prove facts about it [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
For Descartes, objects have one primary quality, which is geometrical [Descartes, by Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Why does pain make us sad? [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Most perception is one-tenth observation and nine-tenths inference [Mill]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Dogs can make the same judgements as us about variable things [Gassendi on Descartes]
We perceive objects by intellect, not by senses or imagination [Descartes]
The wax is not perceived by the senses, but by the mind alone [Descartes]
We don't 'see' men in heavy clothes, we judge them to be men [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
Clear concepts result from good observation, extensive experience, and accurate memory [Mill]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations [Descartes]
Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum) [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Even if my body and objects are imaginary, there may be simpler things which are true [Descartes]
Descartes can't begin again, because sceptics doubt cognitive processes as well as beliefs [Pollock/Cruz on Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
If pain is felt in a lost limb, I cannot be certain that a felt pain exists in my real limbs [Descartes]
We correct sense errors with other senses, not intellect [Mersenne on Descartes]
The senses can only report, so perception errors are in the judgment [Gassendi on Descartes]
It is prudent never to trust your senses if they have deceived you even once [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 4. Demon Scepticism
God may have created nothing, but made his creation appear to me as it does now [Descartes]
To achieve full scepticism, I imagine a devil who deceives me about the external world and my own body and senses [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
Waking actions are joined by memory to all our other actions, unlike actions of which we dream [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
I can only sense an object if it is present, and can't fail to sense it when it is [Descartes]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
Inductive generalisation is more reliable than one of its instances; they can't all be wrong [Mill]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
The whole theory of induction rests on causes [Mill]
Mill's methods (Difference,Agreement,Residues,Concomitance,Hypothesis) don't nail induction [Mill, by Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience [Mill, by Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Explanation is fitting of facts into ever more general patterns of regularity [Mill, by Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Causal inference is by spotting either Agreements or Differences [Mill, by Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
The Methods of Difference and of Agreement are forms of inference to the best explanation [Mill, by Lipton]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza on Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We discovers others as well as ourselves in the Cogito [Sartre on Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Faculties of the mind aren't parts, as one mind uses them [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Descartes put thought at the centre of the mind problem, but we put sensation [Rey on Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Descartes mentions many cognitive faculties, but reduces them to will and intellect [Descartes, by Schmid]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Imagination and sensation are non-essential to mind [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
We can focus our minds on what is common to a whole class, neglecting other aspects [Mill]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
We don't recognise comparisons by something in our minds; the concepts result from the comparisons [Mill]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Some cause must unite the separate temporal sections of a person [Descartes]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
Since I only observe myself to be thinking, I conclude that that is my essence [Descartes]
I can exist without imagination and sensing, but they can't exist without me [Descartes]
For Descartes a person's essence is the mind because objects are perceived by mind, not senses [Descartes, by Feuerbach]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Our 'will' just consists of the feeling that when we are motivated to do something, there are no external pressures [Descartes]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks [Descartes]
Mind is not extended, unlike the body [Descartes]
Descartes is a substance AND property dualist [Descartes, by Kim]
The mind is utterly indivisible [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Interaction between mental and physical seems to violate the principle of conservation of energy [Rowlands on Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
The 'thinking thing' may be the physical basis of the mind [Hobbes on Descartes]
Knowing different aspects of brain/mind doesn't make them different [Rorty on Descartes]
Descartes gives no clear criterion for individuating mental substances [Cottingham on Descartes]
Does Descartes have a clear conception of how mind unites with body? [Spinoza on Descartes]
Even Descartes may concede that mental supervenes on neuroanatomical [Lycan on Descartes]
Superman's strength is indubitable, Clark Kent's is doubtful, so they are not the same? [Maslin on Descartes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it [Descartes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Descartes created the modern view of rationality, as an internal feature instead of an external vision [Descartes, by Taylor,C]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
I make errors because my will extends beyond my understanding [Descartes]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
True ideas are images, such as of a man, a chimera, or God [Descartes]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
All ideas are adventitious, and come from the senses [Gassendi on Descartes]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
The ideas of God and of my self are innate in me [Descartes]
I can think of innumerable shapes I have never experienced [Descartes]
The idea of a supremely perfect being is within me, like the basic concepts of mathematics [Descartes]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
General conceptions are a necessary preliminary to Induction [Mill]
The study of the nature of Abstract Ideas does not belong to logic, but to a different science [Mill]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Many causes are quite baffling, so it is absurd to deduce causes from final purposes [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
A cause is the total of all the conditions which inevitably produce the result [Mill]
There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill]
The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Causation is just invariability of succession between every natural fact and a preceding fact [Mill]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
A cause is an antecedent which invariably and unconditionally leads to a phenomenon [Mill]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Mill's regularity theory of causation is based on an effect preceded by a conjunction of causes [Mill, by Psillos]
In Mill's 'Method of Agreement' cause is the common factor in a range of different cases [Mill, by Psillos]
In Mill's 'Method of Difference' the cause is what stops the effect when it is removed [Mill, by Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
What are the fewest propositions from which all natural uniformities could be inferred? [Mill]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
The past has ceased to exist, and the future does not yet exist, so time does not exist [William of Ockham]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Nothing apart from God could have essential existence, and such a being must be unique and eternal [Descartes]
God the creator is an intelligent, infinite, powerful substance [Descartes]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
It is self-evident that deception is a natural defect, so God could not be a deceiver [Descartes]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
William of Ockham is the main spokesman for God's commands being the source of morality [William of Ockham]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Existence and God's essence are inseparable, like a valley and a mountain, or a triangle and its properties [Descartes]
One idea leads to another, but there must be an initial idea that contains the reality of all the others [Descartes]
The idea of God in my mind is like the mark a craftsman puts on his work [Descartes]
I cannot think of a supremely perfect being without the supreme perfection of existence [Descartes]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
We mustn't worship God as an image because we have no idea of him [Hobbes on Descartes]
We can never conceive of an infinite being [Gassendi on Descartes]
Descartes cannot assume that a most perfect being exists without contradictions [Leibniz on Descartes]
Existence is not a perfection; it is what makes perfection possible [Gassendi on Descartes]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / c. Angels
Even an angel must have some location [William of Ockham, by Pasnau]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / c. Human Error
God didn't give us good judgement even about our own lives [Gassendi on Descartes]
Error arises because my faculty for judging truth is not infinite [Descartes]
Since God does not wish to deceive me, my judgement won't make errors if I use it properly [Descartes]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
If we ask whether God's works are perfect, we must not take a narrow viewpoint, but look at the universe as a whole [Descartes]