Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'System of Logic', 'Naming and Necessity notes and addenda' and 'Unpublished Notebooks 1884-85'

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96 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
All the major problems were formulated before Socrates [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
What matters is how humans can be developed [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Thinkers might agree some provisional truths, as methodological assumptions [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Aristotle enjoyed the sham generalities of a system, as the peak of happiness! [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
Thoughts are uncertain, and are just occasions for interpretation [Nietzsche]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
What physical facts could underlie 0 or 1, or very large numbers? [Frege on Mill]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Mathematics is just accurate inferences from definitions, and doesn't involve objects [Nietzsche]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
Combining two distinct assertions does not necessarily lead to a single 'complex proposition' [Mill]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
All names are names of something, real or imaginary [Mill]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Mill says names have denotation but not connotation [Mill, by Kripke]
Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object [Mill, by Lycan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
Numbers must be assumed to have identical units, as horses are equalised in 'horse-power' [Mill]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
The only axioms needed are for equality, addition, and successive numbers [Mill, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Arithmetic is based on definitions, and Sums of equals are equal, and Differences of equals are equal [Mill]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Mill says logic and maths is induction based on a very large number of instances [Mill, by Ayer]
If two black and two white objects in practice produced five, what colour is the fifth one? [Lewis,CI on Mill]
Mill mistakes particular applications as integral to arithmetic, instead of general patterns [Dummett on Mill]
There are no such things as numbers in the abstract [Mill]
Things possess the properties of numbers, as quantity, and as countable parts [Mill]
Numbers have generalised application to entities (such as bodies or sounds) [Mill]
Different parcels made from three pebbles produce different actual sensations [Mill]
'2 pebbles and 1 pebble' and '3 pebbles' name the same aggregation, but different facts [Mill]
3=2+1 presupposes collections of objects ('Threes'), which may be divided thus [Mill]
Numbers denote physical properties of physical phenomena [Mill]
We can't easily distinguish 102 horses from 103, but we could arrange them to make it obvious [Mill]
Arithmetical results give a mode of formation of a given number [Mill]
12 is the cube of 1728 means pebbles can be aggregated a certain way [Mill]
Numbers must be of something; they don't exist as abstractions [Mill]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Mill is too imprecise, and is restricted to simple arithmetic [Kitcher on Mill]
Empirical theories of arithmetic ignore zero, limit our maths, and need probability to get started [Frege on Mill]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Numbers are a very general property of objects [Mill, by Brown,JR]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
There is no 'being'; it is just the opposition to nothingness [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
I only want thinking that is anchored in body, senses and earth [Nietzsche]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Whatever is made up of parts is made up of parts of those parts [Mill]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
The essence is that without which a thing can neither be, nor be conceived to be [Mill]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Necessity is what will be, despite any alternative suppositions whatever [Mill]
Necessity can only mean what must be, without conditions of any kind [Mill]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary [Kripke]
What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity [Kripke]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
We can only understand through concepts, which subsume particulars in generalities [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
Strongly believed a priori is not certain; it may just be a feature of our existence [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Most perception is one-tenth observation and nine-tenths inference [Mill]
An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
Clear concepts result from good observation, extensive experience, and accurate memory [Mill]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
We now have innumerable perspectives to draw on [Nietzsche]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
Inductive generalisation is more reliable than one of its instances; they can't all be wrong [Mill]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
The whole theory of induction rests on causes [Mill]
Mill's methods (Difference,Agreement,Residues,Concomitance,Hypothesis) don't nail induction [Mill, by Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience [Mill, by Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Explanation is fitting of facts into ever more general patterns of regularity [Mill, by Ruben]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Causal inference is by spotting either Agreements or Differences [Mill, by Lipton]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
The Methods of Difference and of Agreement are forms of inference to the best explanation [Mill, by Lipton]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Mind is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification, aimed at control [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
We can focus our minds on what is common to a whole class, neglecting other aspects [Mill]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
We don't recognise comparisons by something in our minds; the concepts result from the comparisons [Mill]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
A cognitive mechanism wanting to know itself is absurd! [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
A 'person' is just one possible abstraction from a bundle of qualities [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
I have perfected fatalism, as recurrence and denial of the will [Nietzsche]
Fate is inspiring, if you understand you are part of it [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
We start with images, then words, and then concepts, to which emotions attach [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
General conceptions are a necessary preliminary to Induction [Mill]
The study of the nature of Abstract Ideas does not belong to logic, but to a different science [Mill]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Judging actions by intentions - like judging painters by their thoughts! [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Values need a perspective, of preserving some aspect of life [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
If you love something, it is connected with everything, so all must be affirmed as good [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Egoism should not assume that all egos are equal [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
After Socrates virtue is misunderstood, as good for all, not for individuals [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
We contain multitudes of characters, which can brought into the open [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 8. Eternal Recurrence
Who can endure the thought of eternal recurrence? [Nietzsche]
If you want one experience repeated, you must want all of them [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Humans are determined by community, so its preservation is their most valued drive [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
There is always slavery, whether we like it or not [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
After history following God, or a people, or an idea, we now see it in terms of animals [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Cause and effect is a hypothesis, based on our supposed willing of actions [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
A cause is the total of all the conditions which inevitably produce the result [Mill]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill]
The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Causation is just invariability of succession between every natural fact and a preceding fact [Mill]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
A cause is an antecedent which invariably and unconditionally leads to a phenomenon [Mill]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Mill's regularity theory of causation is based on an effect preceded by a conjunction of causes [Mill, by Psillos]
In Mill's 'Method of Agreement' cause is the common factor in a range of different cases [Mill, by Psillos]
In Mill's 'Method of Difference' the cause is what stops the effect when it is removed [Mill, by Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
What are the fewest propositions from which all natural uniformities could be inferred? [Mill]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Having a sense of time presupposes absolute time [Nietzsche]