96 ideas
24146 | All the major problems were formulated before Socrates [Nietzsche] |
24142 | What matters is how humans can be developed [Nietzsche] |
24143 | Thinkers might agree some provisional truths, as methodological assumptions [Nietzsche] |
24125 | Aristotle enjoyed the sham generalities of a system, as the peak of happiness! [Nietzsche] |
24147 | Thoughts are uncertain, and are just occasions for interpretation [Nietzsche] |
8625 | What physical facts could underlie 0 or 1, or very large numbers? [Frege on Mill] |
24137 | Mathematics is just accurate inferences from definitions, and doesn't involve objects [Nietzsche] |
17895 | Combining two distinct assertions does not necessarily lead to a single 'complex proposition' [Mill] |
10427 | All names are names of something, real or imaginary [Mill] |
4944 | Mill says names have denotation but not connotation [Mill, by Kripke] |
7762 | Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object [Mill, by Lycan] |
9801 | Numbers must be assumed to have identical units, as horses are equalised in 'horse-power' [Mill] |
8742 | The only axioms needed are for equality, addition, and successive numbers [Mill, by Shapiro] |
9800 | Arithmetic is based on definitions, and Sums of equals are equal, and Differences of equals are equal [Mill] |
5201 | Mill says logic and maths is induction based on a very large number of instances [Mill, by Ayer] |
9360 | If two black and two white objects in practice produced five, what colour is the fifth one? [Lewis,CI on Mill] |
9888 | Mill mistakes particular applications as integral to arithmetic, instead of general patterns [Dummett on Mill] |
9794 | There are no such things as numbers in the abstract [Mill] |
9796 | Things possess the properties of numbers, as quantity, and as countable parts [Mill] |
9795 | Numbers have generalised application to entities (such as bodies or sounds) [Mill] |
9798 | Different parcels made from three pebbles produce different actual sensations [Mill] |
9797 | '2 pebbles and 1 pebble' and '3 pebbles' name the same aggregation, but different facts [Mill] |
9799 | 3=2+1 presupposes collections of objects ('Threes'), which may be divided thus [Mill] |
9802 | Numbers denote physical properties of physical phenomena [Mill] |
9803 | We can't easily distinguish 102 horses from 103, but we could arrange them to make it obvious [Mill] |
9804 | Arithmetical results give a mode of formation of a given number [Mill] |
9805 | 12 is the cube of 1728 means pebbles can be aggregated a certain way [Mill] |
8741 | Numbers must be of something; they don't exist as abstractions [Mill] |
12411 | Mill is too imprecise, and is restricted to simple arithmetic [Kitcher on Mill] |
5656 | Empirical theories of arithmetic ignore zero, limit our maths, and need probability to get started [Frege on Mill] |
9624 | Numbers are a very general property of objects [Mill, by Brown,JR] |
24131 | There is no 'being'; it is just the opposition to nothingness [Nietzsche] |
24151 | I only want thinking that is anchored in body, senses and earth [Nietzsche] |
17000 | We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke] |
11868 | A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke] |
9806 | Whatever is made up of parts is made up of parts of those parts [Mill] |
11156 | The essence is that without which a thing can neither be, nor be conceived to be [Mill] |
17044 | A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke] |
16999 | A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke] |
12190 | Necessity is what will be, despite any alternative suppositions whatever [Mill] |
22623 | Necessity can only mean what must be, without conditions of any kind [Mill] |
17058 | What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary [Kripke] |
4970 | What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity [Kripke] |
17059 | Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke] |
4950 | Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke] |
17003 | Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke] |
9221 | The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider] |
24150 | We can only understand through concepts, which subsume particulars in generalities [Nietzsche] |
17052 | The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke] |
24138 | Strongly believed a priori is not certain; it may just be a feature of our existence [Nietzsche] |
16859 | Most perception is one-tenth observation and nine-tenths inference [Mill] |
24130 | An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression [Nietzsche] |
9082 | Clear concepts result from good observation, extensive experience, and accurate memory [Mill] |
24124 | We now have innumerable perspectives to draw on [Nietzsche] |
16860 | Inductive generalisation is more reliable than one of its instances; they can't all be wrong [Mill] |
16845 | The whole theory of induction rests on causes [Mill] |
16843 | Mill's methods (Difference,Agreement,Residues,Concomitance,Hypothesis) don't nail induction [Mill, by Lipton] |
17086 | Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience [Mill, by Ruben] |
17091 | Explanation is fitting of facts into ever more general patterns of regularity [Mill, by Ruben] |
16805 | Causal inference is by spotting either Agreements or Differences [Mill, by Lipton] |
16835 | The Methods of Difference and of Agreement are forms of inference to the best explanation [Mill, by Lipton] |
4969 | I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke] |
24145 | Mind is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification, aimed at control [Nietzsche] |
9079 | We can focus our minds on what is common to a whole class, neglecting other aspects [Mill] |
9081 | We don't recognise comparisons by something in our minds; the concepts result from the comparisons [Mill] |
24144 | A cognitive mechanism wanting to know itself is absurd! [Nietzsche] |
24139 | A 'person' is just one possible abstraction from a bundle of qualities [Nietzsche] |
24133 | I have perfected fatalism, as recurrence and denial of the will [Nietzsche] |
24152 | Fate is inspiring, if you understand you are part of it [Nietzsche] |
24129 | We start with images, then words, and then concepts, to which emotions attach [Nietzsche] |
9080 | General conceptions are a necessary preliminary to Induction [Mill] |
9078 | The study of the nature of Abstract Ideas does not belong to logic, but to a different science [Mill] |
4956 | A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke] |
17032 | Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke] |
24127 | Judging actions by intentions - like judging painters by their thoughts! [Nietzsche] |
24149 | Values need a perspective, of preserving some aspect of life [Nietzsche] |
24148 | If you love something, it is connected with everything, so all must be affirmed as good [Nietzsche] |
24135 | Egoism should not assume that all egos are equal [Nietzsche] |
24132 | After Socrates virtue is misunderstood, as good for all, not for individuals [Nietzsche] |
24126 | We contain multitudes of characters, which can brought into the open [Nietzsche] |
24136 | Who can endure the thought of eternal recurrence? [Nietzsche] |
24154 | If you want one experience repeated, you must want all of them [Nietzsche] |
24153 | Humans are determined by community, so its preservation is their most valued drive [Nietzsche] |
24134 | There is always slavery, whether we like it or not [Nietzsche] |
24128 | After history following God, or a people, or an idea, we now see it in terms of animals [Nietzsche] |
24140 | Cause and effect is a hypothesis, based on our supposed willing of actions [Nietzsche] |
8345 | A cause is the total of all the conditions which inevitably produce the result [Mill] |
10391 | Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill] |
14547 | The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill] |
8377 | Causation is just invariability of succession between every natural fact and a preceding fact [Mill] |
14545 | A cause is an antecedent which invariably and unconditionally leads to a phenomenon [Mill] |
4773 | Mill's regularity theory of causation is based on an effect preceded by a conjunction of causes [Mill, by Psillos] |
4775 | In Mill's 'Method of Agreement' cause is the common factor in a range of different cases [Mill, by Psillos] |
4776 | In Mill's 'Method of Difference' the cause is what stops the effect when it is removed [Mill, by Psillos] |
9417 | What are the fewest propositions from which all natural uniformities could be inferred? [Mill] |
24141 | Having a sense of time presupposes absolute time [Nietzsche] |