14 ideas
| 17892 | For clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers [Gödel] |
| 15943 | Limitation of Size is not self-evident, and seems too strong [Lavine on Neumann] |
| 9188 | Gödel proved that first-order logic is complete, and second-order logic incomplete [Gödel, by Dummett] |
| 17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
| 10620 | Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel] |
| 17883 | Gödel's Theorems did not refute the claim that all good mathematical questions have answers [Gödel, by Koellner] |
| 17885 | Gödel eventually hoped for a generalised completeness theorem leaving nothing undecidable [Gödel, by Koellner] |
| 10614 | The real reason for Incompleteness in arithmetic is inability to define truth in a language [Gödel] |
| 13672 | All the axioms for mathematics presuppose set theory [Neumann] |
| 11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
| 17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
| 17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
| 17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
| 11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |