11 ideas
| 19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
| 8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
| 19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
| 19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
| 19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
| 3916 | Hopi consistently prefers verbs and events to nouns and things [Whorf] |
| 19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
| 3917 | Scientific thought is essentially a specialised part of Indo-European languages [Whorf] |
| 19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
| 10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
| 3915 | The Hopi have no concept of time as something flowing from past to future [Whorf] |