14 ideas
| 19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
| 9456 | Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds [Jacquette] |
| 9457 | The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism [Jacquette] |
| 9458 | Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects [Jacquette] |
| 9461 | Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties [Jacquette] |
| 8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
| 19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
| 19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
| 19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
| 19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
| 19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
| 9460 | Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette] |
| 9459 | Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette] |
| 10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |