Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events and Their Names', 'Phil Applications of Cognitive Science' and 'Defeasibility Theory'

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15 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann]
Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann]
Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann]
You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann]
Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]