16 ideas
11257 | The Pythagoreans were the first to offer definitions [Politis, by Politis] |
12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
11235 | 'True of' is applicable to things, while 'true' is applicable to words [Politis] |
12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
11277 | Maybe 'What is being? is confusing because we can't ask what non-being is like [Politis] |
8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
11248 | Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis] |
12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |