8 ideas
18470 | Maybe truth-making is an unanalysable primitive, but we can specify principles for it [Smith,B] |
7746 | We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle] |
7747 | How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle] |
7748 | 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle] |
7749 | Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle] |
7750 | Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle] |
8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |