Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Event Causation: counterfactual analysis', 'Personal Identity and Individuation' and 'Letters to Des Bosses'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
12780 We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
8439 Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett]
8440 Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
12774 Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz]
12782 Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz]
12777 Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
12778 There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz]
12783 Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
12775 Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
12776 Every substance is alive [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
12753 A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
12781 A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
12779 There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
12785 Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
7946 The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things [Williams,B, by Macdonald,C]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
8441 Delaying a fire doesn't cause it, but hastening it might [Bennett]
8436 Either cause and effect are subsumed under a conditional because of properties, or it is counterfactual [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
8435 Causes are between events ('the explosion') or between facts/states of affairs ('a bomb dropped') [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
8437 The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive [Bennett]
8438 A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence [Bennett]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
12784 Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz]