Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Event Causation: counterfactual analysis', 'Papers of 1906' and 'The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars'

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22 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
8525 Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
8439 Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett]
8440 Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
8518 Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8513 Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K]
8514 Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K]
8522 Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K]
8523 Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K]
8524 Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
8521 Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
8515 Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K]
8519 Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
4033 Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
22306 To explain false belief we should take belief as relating to a proposition's parts, not to the whole thing [Russell]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
8512 Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
8441 Delaying a fire doesn't cause it, but hastening it might [Bennett]
8436 Either cause and effect are subsumed under a conditional because of properties, or it is counterfactual [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
8435 Causes are between events ('the explosion') or between facts/states of affairs ('a bomb dropped') [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8516 Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K]
8517 Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
8437 The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive [Bennett]
8438 A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence [Bennett]