13 ideas
8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
12695 | Epicurean atomists say body is sensible, to distinguish it from space. [Garber] |
11181 | Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11184 | Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11180 | Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11186 | 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11185 | 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11182 | If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11183 | The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11187 | In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)] |
12705 | Epicurean atoms are distinguished by their extreme hardness [Garber] |
10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
11189 | Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)] |