Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events and Their Names', 'Elusive Knowledge' and 'A Priori Knowledge'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


13 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer [Lewis]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction [Lewis]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo]
The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge [Lewis]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Lewis, by Cohen,S]
We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Lewis, by Cohen,S]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]