11 ideas
8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
16079 | De re modal predicates are ambiguous [Lewis, by Rudder Baker] |
3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |
10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |