Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events and Their Names', 'Things qua Truthmakers' and 'The Varieties of Reference'

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8 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Every proposition is entirely about being [Lewis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco]
We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]