Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events and Their Names', 'A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev)' and 'Letters'

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8 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan]
Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage [Quine]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]