12 ideas
8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
17527 | Causation seems to be an innate concept (or acquired very early) [Bird] |
7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
17528 | The dispositional account explains causation, as stimulation and manifestation of dispositions [Bird] |
10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
17526 | The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition [Bird] |