12 ideas
15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
23366 | We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus] |
4022 | Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C] |
23365 | If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus] |
23368 | Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus] |
10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |