19 ideas
13430 | Infinity: there is an infinity of distinguishable individuals [Ramsey] |
13428 | Reducibility: to every non-elementary function there is an equivalent elementary function [Ramsey] |
13427 | Either 'a = b' vacuously names the same thing, or absurdly names different things [Ramsey] |
9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
13334 | Contradictions are either purely logical or mathematical, or they involved thought and language [Ramsey] |
13426 | Formalists neglect content, but the logicists have focused on generalizations, and neglected form [Ramsey] |
13425 | Formalism is hopeless, because it focuses on propositions and ignores concepts [Ramsey] |
8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
22328 | I just confront the evidence, and let it act on me [Ramsey] |
22325 | A belief is knowledge if it is true, certain and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey] |
5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |