13 ideas
| 8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
| 10993 | Ramsey's Test: believe the consequent if you believe the antecedent [Ramsey, by Read] |
| 14279 | Asking 'If p, will q?' when p is uncertain, then first add p hypothetically to your knowledge [Ramsey] |
| 19513 | A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose] |
| 19514 | Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose] |
| 19515 | We can make contextualism more precise, by specifying the discrimination needed each time [DeRose] |
| 19510 | In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief. [DeRose] |
| 19516 | Contextualists worry about scepticism, but they should focus on the use of 'know' in ordinary speech [DeRose] |
| 19511 | If contextualism is about knowledge attribution, rather than knowledge, then it is philosophy of language [DeRose] |
| 6894 | Mental terms can be replaced in a sentence by a variable and an existential quantifier [Ramsey] |
| 10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
| 9418 | All knowledge needs systematizing, and the axioms would be the laws of nature [Ramsey] |
| 9420 | Causal laws result from the simplest axioms of a complete deductive system [Ramsey] |