Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events and Their Names', 'Dispositions and Powers' and 'Logical Necessity'

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28 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
12204 The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
12195 Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt]
12199 There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt]
12201 We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
12194 Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
12198 Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
8978 Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
23708 Humeans see properties as having no more essential features and relations than their distinctness [Friend/Kimpton-Nye, by PG]
23709 Dispositions are what individuate properties, and they constitute their essence [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
23707 Powers are properties which necessitate dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
23714 Dispositional essentialism (unlike the grounding view) says only fundamental properties are powers [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
23711 A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23712 Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
23698 Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23699 'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23700 A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23701 A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23702 A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23703 Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
23704 We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14532 A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12193 Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt]
12200 A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt]
12202 Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
23710 Dispositionalism says modality is in the powers of this world, not outsourced to possible worlds [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
12203 If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
10364 Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
23706 Hume's Dictum says no connections are necessary - so mass and spacetime warping could separate [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]