94 ideas
| 11912 | Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar] |
| 24047 | An account is either a definition or a demonstration [Aristotle] |
| 24052 | From one thing alone we can infer its contrary [Aristotle] |
| 11920 | A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar] |
| 1729 | We perceive number by the denial of continuity [Aristotle] |
| 8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
| 24057 | What is prior is always potentially present in what is next in order [Aristotle] |
| 11919 | Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar] |
| 11929 | The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar] |
| 11927 | Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar] |
| 11915 | If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar] |
| 11916 | 'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar] |
| 11956 | 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar] |
| 11928 | Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar] |
| 11933 | A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar] |
| 11932 | Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar] |
| 11934 | The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar] |
| 11947 | Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar] |
| 11953 | Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar] |
| 11952 | The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar] |
| 16752 | Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle] |
| 11943 | Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar] |
| 11939 | If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar] |
| 11914 | Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar] |
| 11913 | For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar] |
| 11962 | Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar] |
| 24058 | The substance is the cause of a thing's being [Aristotle] |
| 11917 | Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar] |
| 11955 | There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar] |
| 24055 | Matter is potential, form is actual [Aristotle] |
| 24040 | Scientists explain anger by the matter, dialecticians by the form and the account [Aristotle] |
| 11918 | The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar] |
| 11963 | What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar] |
| 5051 | The intellect has potential to think, like a tablet on which nothing has yet been written [Aristotle] |
| 1725 | Why can't we sense the senses? And why do senses need stimuli? [Aristotle] |
| 1730 | Why do we have many senses, and not just one? [Aristotle] |
| 1732 | Sense organs aren't the end of sensation, or they would know what does the sensing [Aristotle] |
| 17711 | Our minds take on the form of what is being perceived [Aristotle, by Mares] |
| 16723 | Perception of sensible objects is virtually never wrong [Aristotle] |
| 1724 | Perception necessitates pleasure and pain, which necessitates appetite [Aristotle] |
| 1728 | Many objects of sensation are common to all the senses [Aristotle] |
| 1727 | Some objects of sensation are unique to one sense, where deception is impossible [Aristotle] |
| 1734 | In moral thought images are essential, to be pursued or avoided [Aristotle] |
| 1726 | We may think when we wish, but not perceive, because universals are within the mind [Aristotle] |
| 24048 | Demonstrations move from starting-points to deduced conclusions [Aristotle] |
| 16647 | Demonstration starts from a definition of essence, so we can derive (or conjecture about) the properties [Aristotle] |
| 11951 | Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar] |
| 16646 | To understand a triangle summing to two right angles, we need to know the essence of a line [Aristotle] |
| 11936 | The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar] |
| 1714 | Mind involves movement, perception, incorporeality [Aristotle] |
| 5507 | Aristotle led to the view that there are several souls, all somewhat physical [Aristotle, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 24051 | Soul is seen as what moves, or what is least physical, or a combination of elements [Aristotle] |
| 12086 | Psuché is the form and actuality of a body which potentially has life [Aristotle] |
| 16754 | The soul is the cause or source of movement, the essence of body, and its end [Aristotle] |
| 24046 | Understanding is impossible, if it involves the understanding having parts [Aristotle] |
| 1717 | If the soul is composed of many physical parts, it can't be a true unity [Aristotle] |
| 24053 | If a soul have parts, what unites them? [Aristotle] |
| 1721 | What unifies the soul would have to be a super-soul, which seems absurd [Aristotle] |
| 1735 | In a way the soul is everything which exists, through its perceptions and thoughts [Aristotle] |
| 11935 | Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar] |
| 24061 | If we divide the mind up according to its capacities, there are a lot of them [Aristotle] |
| 24062 | Self-moving animals must have desires, and that entails having imagination [Aristotle] |
| 1710 | Emotion involves the body, thinking uses the mind, imagination hovers between them [Aristotle] |
| 24039 | All the emotions seem to involve the body, simultaneously with the feeling [Aristotle] |
| 24056 | The soul (or parts of it) is not separable from the body [Aristotle] |
| 11944 | Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar] |
| 24050 | If soul is separate from body, why does it die when the body dies? [Aristotle] |
| 24049 | Thinkers place the soul within the body, but never explain how they are attached [Aristotle] |
| 1514 | Early thinkers concentrate on the soul but ignore the body, as if it didn't matter what body received the soul [Aristotle] |
| 2683 | Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle] |
| 1718 | Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle] |
| 13275 | The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax [Aristotle] |
| 1733 | Thinking is not perceiving, but takes the form of imagination and speculation [Aristotle] |
| 23307 | Aristotle makes belief a part of reason, but sees desires as separate [Aristotle, by Sorabji] |
| 24060 | Self-controlled follow understanding, when it is opposed to desires [Aristotle] |
| 4376 | Pleasure and pain are perceptions of things as good or bad [Aristotle] |
| 1740 | Nature does nothing in vain [Aristotle] |
| 11960 | Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar] |
| 11937 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar] |
| 11954 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar] |
| 10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
| 11961 | Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar] |
| 11959 | Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar] |
| 9448 | Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford] |
| 11930 | One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar] |
| 11957 | It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar] |
| 11921 | The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar] |
| 1739 | If all movement is either pushing or pulling, there must be a still point in between where it all starts [Aristotle] |
| 24044 | Movement can be intrinsic (like a ship) or relative (like its sailors) [Aristotle] |
| 24045 | Movement is spatial, alteration, withering or growth [Aristotle] |
| 1738 | Practical reason is based on desire, so desire must be the ultimate producer of movement [Aristotle] |
| 24064 | If something is pushed, it pushes back [Aristotle] |
| 11931 | Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar] |
| 24063 | What is born has growth, a prime, and a withering away [Aristotle] |