23 ideas
7740 | There exists a realm, beyond objects and ideas, of non-spatio-temporal thoughts [Frege, by Weiner] |
17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
19466 | The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege] |
19465 | There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege] |
19468 | The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege] |
17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
19470 | Thoughts in the 'third realm' cannot be sensed, and do not need an owner to exist [Frege] |
8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
19471 | A fact is a thought that is true [Frege] |
9877 | Late Frege saw his non-actual objective objects as exclusively thoughts and senses [Frege, by Dummett] |
17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
19469 | We grasp thoughts (thinking), decide they are true (judgement), and manifest the judgement (assertion) [Frege] |
8162 | Thoughts have their own realm of reality - 'sense' (as opposed to the realm of 'reference') [Frege, by Dummett] |
9818 | A thought is distinguished from other things by a capacity to be true or false [Frege, by Dummett] |
16379 | Thoughts about myself are understood one way to me, and another when communicated [Frege] |
17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |
19467 | A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege] |
19472 | A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege] |
10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |