Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events and Their Names', 'Realism, Mathematics and Modality' and 'The Causal Theory of Names'

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12 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Fictionalists say 2+2=4 is true in the way that 'Oliver Twist lived in London' is true [Field,H]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]