17 ideas
12442 | 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni] |
12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
21563 | The 'no classes' theory says the propositions just refer to the members [Russell] |
12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
21565 | Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell] |
21564 | Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell] |
12447 | That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni] |
8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
12445 | If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni] |
12449 | Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni] |
12440 | If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni] |
12438 | In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni] |
12441 | We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni] |
12448 | Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni] |
10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
12450 | The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni] |