Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events and Their Names', 'Deflating Existential Consequence' and 'Explanation and Reference'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

20 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
12442 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
12439 Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
12437 Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
17505 Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
12446 Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
12447 That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
8978 Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
12445 If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
12449 Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
12440 If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
12438 In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni]
12441 We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
12448 Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11908 Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
17508 Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
17506 I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
17507 Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam]
11904 Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
10364 Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
12450 The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni]