15 ideas
13407 | All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau] |
7760 | Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan] |
5811 | A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan] |
5812 | Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan] |
5814 | 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan] |
8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
13409 | Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau] |
13406 | A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau] |
13408 | Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau] |
13410 | Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau] |
10435 | A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury] |
10451 | Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan] |
5813 | A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan] |
5815 | Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan] |
10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |