15 ideas
| 8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
| 8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
| 4483 | If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical [Loux] |
| 4481 | Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux] |
| 4477 | Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux] |
| 4482 | Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux] |
| 4478 | Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'. [Loux] |
| 4480 | Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity [Loux] |
| 8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
| 10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
| 8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
| 10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
| 8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
| 8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
| 10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |