35 ideas
6334 | The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich] |
14480 | Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson] |
6342 | Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich] |
6332 | The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich] |
6335 | The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich] |
6344 | Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich] |
6336 | No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich] |
23299 | Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson] |
6337 | The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich] |
14471 | Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson] |
6339 | Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich] |
14493 | Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson] |
8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
14491 | Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson] |
14489 | Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson] |
14485 | Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson] |
14487 | The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson] |
21651 | It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber] |
14486 | Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson] |
14467 | Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson] |
14479 | To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson] |
14481 | Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson] |
14482 | If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson] |
14483 | Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson] |
14476 | Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson] |
14477 | Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson] |
14478 | Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson] |
14466 | A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson] |
6338 | We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich] |
14475 | How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson] |
14474 | Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson] |
6340 | There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich] |
14488 | Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson] |
6341 | Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich] |
10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |