9 ideas
12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
7295 | Maybe induction is only reliable IF reality is stable [Mitchell,A] |
10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |