9 ideas
15395 | Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron] |
15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron] |
8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
15785 | Our commitments are to an 'ontology', but also to an 'ideology', or conceptual system [Hintikka] |
15401 | Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron] |
15393 | An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron] |
15396 | Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron] |
15786 | Commitment to possible worlds is part of our ideology, not part of our ontology [Hintikka] |
10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |