85 ideas
| 6200 | Wisdom is knowing the highest good, and conforming the will to it [Kant] |
| 6207 | What fills me with awe are the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me [Kant] |
| 6184 | Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher [Kant] |
| 15010 | Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider] |
| 14977 | Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider] |
| 14994 | Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider] |
| 6203 | Metaphysics is just a priori universal principles of physics [Kant] |
| 15003 | It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider] |
| 14986 | Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider] |
| 14981 | Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider] |
| 15015 | It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider] |
| 14992 | We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider] |
| 15012 | Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider] |
| 15023 | The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider] |
| 15004 | 'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider] |
| 14984 | Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider] |
| 14980 | There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider] |
| 15000 | 'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider] |
| 15020 | Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider] |
| 15029 | Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider] |
| 15019 | Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider] |
| 15001 | 'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider] |
| 8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
| 15017 | Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider] |
| 15008 | Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider] |
| 15013 | Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider] |
| 15014 | Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider] |
| 15009 | We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider] |
| 14983 | Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider] |
| 14978 | A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider] |
| 14995 | Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider] |
| 15026 | Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider] |
| 6181 | Necessity cannot be extracted from an empirical proposition [Kant] |
| 15031 | Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider] |
| 15030 | Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider] |
| 15028 | Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider] |
| 15027 | If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider] |
| 15033 | Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider] |
| 15025 | The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider] |
| 14988 | A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider] |
| 14982 | If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider] |
| 14989 | Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider] |
| 14997 | Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider] |
| 14990 | Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider] |
| 15005 | Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider] |
| 15011 | If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider] |
| 15018 | Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider] |
| 14999 | Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider] |
| 14998 | Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider] |
| 15016 | Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider] |
| 6183 | Can pure reason determine the will, or are empirical conditions relevant? [Kant] |
| 6191 | The will is the faculty of purposes, which guide desires according to principles [Kant] |
| 6190 | The sole objects of practical reason are the good and the evil [Kant] |
| 18235 | Only human reason can confer value on our choices [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 6196 | People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous [Kant] |
| 18675 | Kant may rate two things as finally valuable: having a good will, and deserving happiness [Orsi on Kant] |
| 22007 | An autonomous agent has dignity [Würde], which has absolute worth [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 18234 | The good will is unconditionally good, because it is the only possible source of value [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 6192 | Good or evil cannot be a thing, but only a maxim of action, making the person good or evil [Kant] |
| 6197 | Morality involves duty and respect for law, not love of the outcome [Kant] |
| 6193 | Our happiness is all that matters, not as a sensation, but as satisfaction with our whole existence [Kant] |
| 1452 | Happiness is the condition of a rational being for whom everything goes as they wish [Kant] |
| 1454 | Morality is not about making ourselves happy, but about being worthy of happiness [Kant] |
| 6194 | The highest worth for human beings lies in dispositions, not just actions [Kant] |
| 6198 | Virtue is the supreme state of our pursuit of happiness, and so is supreme good [Kant] |
| 1456 | Moral law is holy, and the best we can do is achieve virtue through respect for the law [Kant] |
| 6185 | No one would lend money unless a universal law made it secure, even after death [Kant] |
| 6187 | Universality determines the will, and hence extends self-love into altruism [Kant] |
| 6201 | Everyone (even God) must treat rational beings as ends in themselves, and not just as means [Kant] |
| 6186 | A holy will is incapable of any maxims which conflict with the moral law [Kant] |
| 6195 | Reason cannot solve the problem of why a law should motivate the will [Kant] |
| 6188 | A permanent natural order could not universalise a rule permitting suicide [Kant] |
| 10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
| 14987 | Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider] |
| 14985 | The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider] |
| 14991 | Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider] |
| 15021 | The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider] |
| 15024 | The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider] |
| 6199 | Obligation does not rest on the existence of God, but on the autonomy of reason [Kant] |
| 1453 | We have to postulate something outside nature which makes happiness coincide with morality [Kant] |
| 1455 | Belief in justice requires belief in a place for justice (heaven), a time (eternity), and a cause (God) [Kant, by PG] |
| 6205 | To know if this world must have been created by God, we would need to know all other possible worlds [Kant] |
| 6204 | Using God to explain nature is referring to something inconceivable to explain what is in front of you [Kant] |
| 6206 | From our limited knowledge we can infer great virtues in God, but not ultimate ones [Kant] |
| 6202 | In all naturalistic concepts of God, if you remove the human qualities there is nothing left [Kant] |