Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Event Causation: counterfactual analysis', 'Of Liberty and Necessity' and 'Pragmatism and Deflationism'

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20 ideas

3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak]
For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak]
'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak]
'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak]
Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak]
Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Disquotation is bivalent [Misak]
Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak]
Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak]
Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett]
Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
'Contingent' means that the cause is unperceived, not that there is no cause [Hobbes]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Delaying a fire doesn't cause it, but hastening it might [Bennett]
Either cause and effect are subsumed under a conditional because of properties, or it is counterfactual [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causes are between events ('the explosion') or between facts/states of affairs ('a bomb dropped') [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive [Bennett]
A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence [Bennett]