12 ideas
| 9184 | We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson] |
| 18755 | Validity is explained as truth in all models, because that relies on the logical terms [McGee] |
| 18751 | Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee] |
| 18761 | Second-order variables need to range over more than collections of first-order objects [McGee] |
| 18753 | An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee] |
| 18754 | Logically valid sentences are analytic truths which are just true because of their logical words [McGee] |
| 18757 | Soundness theorems are uninformative, because they rely on soundness in their proofs [McGee] |
| 18760 | The culmination of Euclidean geometry was axioms that made all models isomorphic [McGee] |
| 9183 | Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist [Williamson] |
| 8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
| 18762 | A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee] |
| 10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |