Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Events and Their Names', 'Approaches to Intentionality' and 'Truth-makers'

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14 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
All thinking has content [Lyons]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]