78 ideas
9247 | Life will be lived better if it has no meaning [Camus] |
2922 | All intelligent Romans were Epicureans [Nietzsche] |
6707 | Suicide - whether life is worth living - is the one serious philosophical problem [Camus] |
9245 | To an absurd mind reason is useless, and there is nothing beyond reason [Camus] |
2797 | As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth [Dancy,J] |
23520 | Truth has had to be fought for, and normal life must be sacrificed to achieve it [Nietzsche] |
2914 | One must never ask whether truth is useful [Nietzsche] |
2768 | The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J] |
2765 | Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy [Dancy,J] |
2769 | If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one [Dancy,J] |
2766 | Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J] |
9244 | Logic is easy, but what about logic to the point of death? [Camus] |
2781 | Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties [Dancy,J] |
2745 | A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it [Dancy,J] |
2755 | If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J] |
5677 | Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived [Dancy,J] |
5678 | Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J] |
5681 | Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J] |
5682 | Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J] |
5683 | Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG] |
2778 | Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J] |
5684 | Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences [Dancy,J] |
2777 | Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future [Dancy,J] |
2794 | Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth [Dancy,J] |
2780 | Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism [Dancy,J] |
5679 | We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like [Dancy,J] |
5680 | For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct [Dancy,J] |
2782 | We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist [Dancy,J] |
2775 | It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts [Dancy,J] |
2784 | Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J] |
2785 | Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J] |
2788 | If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality [Dancy,J] |
2787 | Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation [Dancy,J] |
2791 | Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience [Dancy,J] |
2790 | I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) [Dancy,J] |
2754 | Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification [Dancy,J] |
2749 | For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J] |
2770 | Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J] |
2752 | Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J] |
2771 | Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J] |
2756 | If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J] |
2753 | Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J] |
2773 | Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J] |
2779 | Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J] |
2786 | For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J] |
2767 | If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J] |
2776 | Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J] |
2746 | How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J] |
2747 | Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J] |
2772 | Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge [Dancy,J] |
2743 | What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument? [Dancy,J] |
2751 | Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence [Dancy,J] |
2757 | The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J] |
2758 | You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J] |
9249 | Whether we are free is uninteresting; we can only experience our freedom [Camus] |
9253 | The human heart has a tiresome tendency to label as fate only what crushes it [Camus] |
2744 | Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism [Dancy,J] |
2760 | Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications [Dancy,J] |
2761 | If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language? [Dancy,J] |
2763 | There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs [Dancy,J] |
2762 | Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours [Dancy,J] |
9250 | Discussing ethics is pointless; moral people behave badly, and integrity doesn't need rules [Camus] |
2921 | Philosophy grasps the limits of human reason, and values are beyond it [Nietzsche] |
20138 | Christianity is at war with the higher type of man, and excommunicates his basic instincts [Nietzsche] |
9252 | The more one loves the stronger the absurd grows [Camus] |
20375 | Virtues must be highly personal; if not, it is merely respect for a concept [Nietzsche] |
9251 | One can be virtuous through a whim [Camus] |
2915 | Each person should devise his own virtues and categorical imperative [Nietzsche] |
9243 | If we believe existence is absurd, this should dictate our conduct [Camus] |
6708 | Happiness and the absurd go together, each leading to the other [Camus] |
9242 | Essential problems either risk death, or intensify the passion of life [Camus] |
9246 | Danger and integrity are not in the leap of faith, but in remaining poised just before the leap [Camus] |
9248 | It is essential to die unreconciled and not of one's own free will [Camus] |
2920 | A God who cures us of a head cold at the right moment is a total absurdity [Nietzsche] |
2917 | Christianity is a revolt of things crawling on the ground against elevated things [Nietzsche] |
2918 | The story in Genesis is the story of God's fear of science [Nietzsche] |
2919 | 'Faith' means not wanting to know what is true [Nietzsche] |
2916 | The great lie of immortality destroys rationality and natural instinct [Nietzsche] |