73 ideas
2797 | As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth [Dancy,J] |
2768 | The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J] |
2769 | If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one [Dancy,J] |
2765 | Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy [Dancy,J] |
2766 | Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J] |
2781 | Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties [Dancy,J] |
4913 | Brain lesions can erase whole categories of perception, suggesting they are hard-wired [Carter,R] |
16620 | A chair is wood, and its shape is the form; it isn't 'compounded' of the matter and form [Hobbes] |
16622 | Essence is just an artificial word from logic, giving a way of thinking about substances [Hobbes] |
2745 | A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it [Dancy,J] |
2755 | If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J] |
5677 | Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived [Dancy,J] |
5678 | Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J] |
5681 | Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J] |
5683 | Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG] |
5682 | Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J] |
2778 | Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J] |
5684 | Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences [Dancy,J] |
2777 | Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future [Dancy,J] |
2794 | Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth [Dancy,J] |
2780 | Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism [Dancy,J] |
5679 | We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like [Dancy,J] |
5680 | For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct [Dancy,J] |
2782 | We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist [Dancy,J] |
2775 | It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts [Dancy,J] |
4910 | Sense organs don't discriminate; they reduce various inputs to the same electrical pulses [Carter,R] |
4911 | The recognition sequence is: classify, name, locate, associate, feel [Carter,R, by PG] |
2784 | Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J] |
2785 | Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J] |
4919 | There seems to be no dividing line between a memory and a thought [Carter,R] |
2788 | If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality [Dancy,J] |
2787 | Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation [Dancy,J] |
2791 | Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience [Dancy,J] |
2790 | I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) [Dancy,J] |
2754 | Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification [Dancy,J] |
2749 | For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J] |
2770 | Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J] |
2752 | Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J] |
2771 | Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J] |
2756 | If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J] |
2753 | Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J] |
2773 | Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J] |
2779 | Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J] |
2786 | For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J] |
2767 | If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J] |
2776 | Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J] |
2746 | How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J] |
2747 | Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J] |
2772 | Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge [Dancy,J] |
2743 | What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument? [Dancy,J] |
2751 | Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence [Dancy,J] |
2757 | The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J] |
2758 | You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J] |
4908 | No one knows if animals are conscious [Carter,R] |
4902 | Pain doesn't have one brain location, but is linked to attention and emotion [Carter,R] |
4915 | In primates, brain size correlates closely with size of social group [Carter,R] |
4904 | Proper brains appear at seven weeks, and neonates have as many neurons as adults do [Carter,R] |
4917 | Consciousness involves awareness, perception, self-awareness, attention and reflection [Carter,R] |
4916 | There is enormous evidence that consciousness arises in the frontal lobes of the brain [Carter,R] |
4905 | Normal babies seem to have overlapping sense experiences [Carter,R] |
4918 | In blindsight V1 (normal vision) is inactive, but V5 (movement) lights up [Carter,R] |
4912 | Out-of-body experiences may be due to temporary loss of proprioception [Carter,R] |
4920 | Thinking takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex [Carter,R] |
4903 | Scans of brains doing similar tasks produce very similar patterns of activation [Carter,R] |
4906 | Babies show highly emotional brain events, but may well be unaware of them [Carter,R] |
4909 | The only way we can control our emotions is by manipulating the outside world that influences them [Carter,R] |
4914 | A frog will starve to death surrounded by dead flies [Carter,R] |
2744 | Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism [Dancy,J] |
2760 | Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications [Dancy,J] |
2761 | If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language? [Dancy,J] |
2763 | There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs [Dancy,J] |
2762 | Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours [Dancy,J] |
4907 | The 'locus coeruleus' is one of several candidates for the brain's 'pleasure centre' [Carter,R] |