Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics', 'works' and 'Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed)'

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36 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
What matters in mathematics is its objectivity, not the existence of the objects [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / c. Basic theorems of ST
The ordered pairs <x,y> can be reduced to the class of sets of the form {{x},{x,y}} [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
To associate a cardinal with each set, we need the Axiom of Choice to find a representative [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Descartes showed a one-one order-preserving match between points on a line and the real numbers [Descartes, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Intuitionists find the Incompleteness Theorem unsurprising, since proof is intuitive, not formal [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionism says that totality of numbers is only potential, but is still determinate [Dummett]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Ostension is possible for concreta; abstracta can only be referred to via other objects [Dummett, by Hale]
The concrete/abstract distinction seems crude: in which category is the Mistral? [Dummett]
We don't need a sharp concrete/abstract distinction [Dummett]
We can't say that light is concrete but radio waves abstract [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
The context principle for names rules out a special philosophical sense for 'existence' [Dummett]
The objects we recognise the world as containing depends on the structure of our language [Dummett]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Concrete objects such as sounds and smells may not be possible objects of ostension [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
Abstract objects may not cause changes, but they can be the subject of change [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
If we can intuitively apprehend abstract objects, this makes them observable and causally active [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Abstract objects must have names that fall within the range of some functional expression [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale]
Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
There is a modern philosophical notion of 'object', first introduced by Frege [Dummett]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Descartes, by Tuck]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
We have inner awareness of our freedom [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Descartes discussed the interaction problem, and compared it with gravity [Descartes, by Lycan]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Since abstract objects cannot be picked out, we must rely on identity statements [Dummett]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
You can't separate acts from the people performing them [Glover]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
Aggression in defence may be beneficial but morally corrupting [Glover]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences [Glover]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Satisfaction of desires is not at all the same as achieving happiness [Glover, by PG]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
Rule-utilitarianism is either act-utilitarianism, or not really utilitarian [Glover]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / a. Human population
How can utilitarianism decide the ideal population size? [Glover]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature is devoid of thought [Descartes, by Meillassoux]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Matter can't just be Descartes's geometry, because a filler of the spaces is needed [Robinson,H on Descartes]